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ON OPTIMAL PRODUCTION AND THE MARKET TO BOOK
RATIO GIVEN LIMITED SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION*
THOMAS E. CONINE, JR., OSCAR W. JENSEN AND MAURRY TAMARKIN
School of Business, Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut 06430-7524
School of Business, Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut 06430-7524
School of Management, Clark University, Worcester,Massachusetts 01610
Our purpose is to examine a firm's optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders
hold a limited number of risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the marketto-book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a
negative relationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification.
(MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO; ANTIDIVERSIFICATION; MAYSHAR CAPM)

1. Introduction
The relationship between valuation and microeconomic structure under conditions
of uncertainty is a contemporary concern. Many articles have appeared recently that link
valuation, in the context of the standard capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), to a firm's product and factor markets. The most
noteworthy to the following analysis are Booth (1981), Conine (1983), Greenberg et al.
(1978), Harpaz-Thomadakis (1982), Hite (1977), Lin (1979), Long-Racette (1974),
Subrahmanyam-Thomadakis (1980) and Thomadakis (1976).
The purpose of this article is to examine a firm's output decision and market value to
book value ratio when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets; that is, they
hold a subset of the market portfolio. This relationship in this framework has not been
examined previously, and it integrates financial valuation with the microeconomic structure of a firm's optimal output decision in a partial equilibrium.' The impact of this
limited diversification is examined in the framework of the capital asset pricing model,
hereafter CAPM, as formulated by Mayshar (1979), (1981) . The microeconomic analogue of the Modigliani-Miller (1961) true growth model, resulting from market imperfections, is developed in a world of limited shareholder diversification.
The primary theoretical result indicates that the market to book ratio is a function of
the degree of shareholder diversification, hereafter antidiversification. An intriguing implication of our model is a rationale for converting a public firm to a private firm, i.e.
"taking a company private." As in many areas of finance, such as dividend policy, management should be aware of its shareholder clientele. For example, in our model a few
undiversified investors, ceteris paribus, would place a higher value on the firm than
would many diversified investors. A suggestion is presented as to how management can
determine easily the degree to which its shareholders are diversified. There are three
pragmatic (and related) reasons for examining how antidiversification affects a firm's
valuation. First, the observed behavior of individual investors demonstrates that the
majority hold imperfectly diversified portfolios.2 The second reason is that, since the
* Accepted by William T. Ziemba; received August 1985. This paper has been with the authors 13 months
for 3 revisions.
' For a concise survey of the financial determinants of systematic risk, see Bowman (1979). SubrahmanyamThomadakis (1980) derived the relationship between systematic risk and microeconomic variables such as
Lerner's index of monopoly power (which is directly related to the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand),
and the labor-capital ratio of a firm.
2 In the Wharton Survey of 1975 (Blume and Friend 1978), the median number of stocks held was found
to be fewer than four, with 34 percent holding no more than two. Blume and Friend (1975) found that based
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inception of testing the standard CAPM, researchershave often found that variance (in
addition to beta) is a significant explanatory variable of returns.3While all empirical tests
do not agree, the evidence suggests that variance not be overlooked. Third, surveys have
shown that the standard CAPM has gained a widespread acceptance for cost of capital
estimation for both regulatedand nonregulatedfirms. Considering the evidence of average
investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and widespread acceptance of the standard CAPM for cost of equity capital estimation, the question of an
optimal output decision in a world of antidiversification is of more significance than
simply theoretical argument.
?2 provides a review of the Mayshar CAPM. In ?3 the theoretical relationship between
valuation and antidiversification is developed. In ?4 we empirically examine the relationship between market-to-book ratios and shareholder diversification. The final section
concludes the analysis.
2. Asset Pricing with Antidiversification
The absence of transaction costs in the standard capital asset pricing model is often
viewed as being a minor idealization. As Mayshar ( 1979), (1981 ) has shown, however,
even with relatively small fixed transaction costs the risk premium of an asset will depend
upon a weighted average of its covariance with the market and its own-variance.4 This
result obtains because with transaction costs it is apparent that an investor may not trade
in all risk assets. As a result, variance although diversifiable, can be relevant to the pricing
of a risk asset. In the standard CAPM with no market frictions, all investors own the
market portfolio and therefore are totally diversified. Variance plays no direct role in the
valuation of a risk asset. Transaction costs in the Mayshar CAPM include not only
brokers' fees and losses due to the bid-ask spread but also include various other obstacles
to trade, such as nondivisibility of assets, shortsale restrictions, institutional restraints,
and even the subjective costs of managing one's own portfolio. For a further discussion
of the nature of transaction costs see Mayshar ( 1978).
The weights, applied to both an assets covariance with the market and its own variance,
are a function of the degree of diversification of the firm's shareholders. The implication

on a sample of individual income tax returnsfrom 1971 considering only dividend paying stocks, 35.15 percent
of investors held only one stock, 50.51 percent of investors held no more than two, and 10.72 percent held ten
or more stocks. Blume, Friend and Crockett (1974) in a study that included nondividend paying stocks found
the median number of holdings of stock was two, while the average was 3.41. In both Blume and Friend (1975)
and (1978) other measures of diversification were employed with the results confirming the conclusion that
individual investors are, on average, highly undiversified.
3In an early test, Douglas (1968) found residual variance to be a significant explanatory variable. MillerScholes (1972) also found residual variance to be a significantexplanatory variableand concluded that skewness
in the return generating process caused the observed association. In contrast, Fama and MacBeth (1973), using
portfolio grouping procedures, found that coefficient of residual variance was not significantly different from
zero. Roll (1977) arguedthat the groupingproceduresreducedthe skewness in returndistributionsand accounted
for the difference between Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Miller-Scholes (1972). However, Friend, Westerfield
and Granito (1978) discovered that with broader market indexes residual standard deviation was extremely
significant in both individual asset and grouping tests, thus suggesting that return skewness may not be an
adequate explanation. Levy (1979), in an analysis similar to Mayshar (1981), also found that variance was a
very significant explanatory variable (even more so than beta). We recognize that even though tests use residual
variance and variance, in theory they are not the same. That is, residual variance is that part of variance that
is diversifiable.Lakonishok-Shapiro(1986) also examines the impact of variancein the returngeneratingprocess.
We acknowledge Roll's (1977) criticism which suggests that a valid test of the CAPM has not been made,
and it is doubtful that a valid test can be made.
4 A similar result has been shown by Levy (1979), and has been argued by Lintner (1978) and Tobin and
Brainard (1977).
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is that own-variance can affect significantlyboth the equilibrium rate of returnand market
valuation of an asset.
The market value, Sj, formulation of the Mayshar ( 198 1) CAPM is given by5
Sj= lI+R {E(CFj) -j[djcov

(CFj,CF,,) +(1

-dj)oCFJ]}

(1)

where R is the risk free rate, E(CFj) is the expected cash flow of a firmj, Xjis the market
price of risk, cov (CFj, CF,,,) is the covariance between the cash flow of firmj and market
portfolio, o4cFj is the variance of the cash flow of firm j, and dj which is constrained to
be bounded by zero and one represents the degree to which the shareholders of firm j
are diversified. If dj equals one, all shareholders own the market portfolio and equation
( 1 ) reduces to the standard CAPM. As the degree of antidiversification increases, dj
approaches zero. When dj equals zero, asset j is the only risky asset held by each of the
investors inj. Under this extreme form of antidiversification only own-variance matters.
There is no reason for the market value of j to depend upon its covariance with other
assets.
A fundamental question in the implementation of the MaysharCAPM is the estimation
of the firm's dj. One can argue it is incumbent upon management to know who its
shareholders are. This may not be feasible in very large publicly traded firms (except that
management certainly has access to shareholder lists routinely compiled by the firm's
Transfer Agent). A reasonable (downside) proxy can be the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors (we assume that the vast majority of institutional
investors, because of fiduciary responsibility, employ fairly diversified investment strategies).6 In Table 1 can be found data available from quarterlyreports filed by institutions
with the SEC (this covers investment advisers, banks, insurance companies and mutual
funds). It is evident that substantial variation exists in the institutional ownership of
common stock, even within an industry. Surveys also have shown that these types of
companies use the standard CAPM in the estimation of their cost of equity capital. The
average institutional ownership of all publicly traded companies in the U.S., at monthend June 1986, was 35.9 percent. While institutional investment concentration certainly
changes over time, this evidence, linked with the aforementioned survey evidence of
average individual investor stock holdings, results of empirical testing of the CAPM, and
recognition that the standard CAPM has received widespread acceptance for cost of
capital estimation, suggest that management should be aware of its shareholder clientele
for its impact on decision-making.
3. The Model
In this section we derive a firm's market value to book value ratio in a world of
antidiversification. The development is similar to Thomadakis ( 1976), SubrahmanyamThomadakis (1980), and Conine (1983). An all-equity firm in a taxless world is assumed.
We first rewrite equation ( 1) as
Sj( 1 + R) = E(CFj) -AjX{

dj cov* (CFj, CF,f) + (1 -

dj4cFj+

where cov* (CFj, CF,,) = cov (CFj, CF,,

-

dj)4CFj}

(2)

CFj).

S Our equation ( 1 ) is Mayshar's equation ( 17), the basic result of his paper. Mayshar's equation ( 17) is in
a unit formulation; therefore, as he suggests ( 1981, p. 589), multiply both sides of his equation ( 17) by the
number of units of the asset to arrive at the aggregatemarket value given by our equation ( 1). As discussed by
Mayshar ( 1979), ( 1981 ) the assignment problem of which assets are held by a particularinvestor is exogenous,
only the equilibrium values and rates of return are derived. In addition, see Mayshar ( 1978 ).
6 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the number of investors in an asset may not be synonymous with
the degree of diversification of those investors.
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TABLE 1
InstituitionalOwnership of Common Stock
A Provy for dj

Company

Percentage of Common Stock
held by Institutions

International Business Machines
General Electric
Exxon Corporation
General Motors Corporation
Philip Morris, Inc.
Eastman Kodak Company
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Atlantic Richfield Company
Digital Equipment Corporation
Standard Oil Company (Indiana)

48.5
48.8
33.0
38.6
60.6
46.1
60.9
50.8
86.4
35.3

* The ten largestcompanies in the U.S. rankedby market value of institutional
holdings as of month-end June 1986 as found in Barron's.

Rearranging (2) and using an approximation so that the firm specific Xjdycan be
replaced by X a market-wide parameter,7'8we obtain
S1( 1 + R) = E(CFj)

-

X[cov* (CFj, CFm)

+f

jlFJ]

(3)

where f = I/ dj.
There are several ways uncertainty can enter the demand-price trade-off. We use the
multiplicative demand function of Dhrymes ( 1964). It is given by (tildes denote random
variables)
pi

= djQ"'

where

(4)

Pj = price per unit sold of the jth firm,
Qj = output of jth firm,
X = the constant elasticity in absolute value (q > 1), and9'0

aj = the random demand parameter assumed to follow a zero drift random walk.
The realization of the demand parameter reflects changes in any of the factors in the
determination of the demand-price trade-off. Examples are realizations of aggregate income, consumer preferences, and changes in the prices of substitutes and complements.
These factors induce shifts in the demand-price trade-off rather than movement
along it.

We assume, as in Mayshar( 1979), for mathematicaltractability,that all investorsexhibit identicalcautiousness
and have homogeneous expectations of cash flows (in Mayshar ( 1981 ) heterogeneity among investors with
respect to expected cash flow was introduced).
8 More specifically, the approximation depends upon the assumption that holders of different assets have no
systematic differencesin their degree of risk aversion. Mayshar( 1981) discussesthe ramificationsof reformulating
the model to this additional assumption.
9 To show that constant elasticity is implied by the multiplicative demand function requiresthe simultaneous
substitution of the first derivative of equation (4) with respect to demand, and equation (4) itself into the
formulation for price elasticity of demand. A model with constant elasticity is utilized because ( 1 ) the majority
of empirical studies have employed logarithmicregression,and (2) elasticity is not constant along linear demandprice relationship.
0 The constant elasticity in absolute value is assumed to be greater than one to satisfy the second-order
condition for maximization. This is consistent with Greenberg et al. ( 1978), Subrahmanyam-Thomadakis
( 1980) and Thomadakis ( 1976).
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The total revenue for the jth firm is then expressed as

TRj = diQ ((5)/)
where TRj is the total revenue.
The variable cost per unit sold is denoted by Vj and for mathematical tractability is
assumed constant. After optimal output is determined, sufficient capital is obtained at a
cost of K per unit of output. The per unit liquidation value also is assumed to be K.
Normatively, this liquidation value will represent a return of initial capital. The random
end-of-period cash flow j then is given by
Un0)/?7]

(6)

-VjQj+KQ-.

Since the Mayshar CAPM is cast in a single period, the firm is assumed to invest
sufficiently at the beginning of the period to produce the optimal output. At the end of
the period the firm adjusts the price to clear the market. All trading is assumed to take
place at the end of the period, when realization of total revenue, cost and liquidation
value occurs.
The optimal output will be the Qj which maximizes the net present value of the firm,
SKQj. We now express equation (3) in the context of the micro-economic variables
by using equation (6),
Sj( 1 + R) = E(aj)Q'(t

1)/n] + (K

-

-

Vj))Qj
Q..

)/cov*

fC[2(?7-1)/n]
(aj, CFm) +?fQj

0].2

(7)

Before forming the net present value (NPV), we make a notational transformation. Let
8 = i/(7 - 1) and Z = Q'1I. The NPV now equals Sj - KZ' so that
NPV = (1/1 + R) {ZE(aj)-

[Vj + KR]Z-

X[Z cov * (aj, CF)

+Z2f]}.

(8)

To maximize end of period market value requiresdetermination of the optimal output
that maximizes the net present value made at the beginning of the single period. Optimizing (8) with respect to Z we obtain
E(aj)

Xcov* (aj, CF,) - 2Xoa5fZ*j -[j
E(a.) - Xcov* (aj, CF,n1)- 2XajfZ*

+ KR]Z*I-I = 0

-

-

j + KR]Z

or

(9)
(10)

and Z* represents optimal output.
Equation (9) is an implicit function for optimal output that cannot be solved in closed
form for an arbitrary price elasticity of demand. Conceptually, the net present value is
the present value of market imperfections (or monopoly rents) arising from barriersto
entry and is seen to be a function of shareholder diversification. In the Modigliani-Miller
world, equation (9) represents the capitalized value of: (1) the differential of realized
and required return, (2) the duration of the differential, and (3) the level of investment.
This equation is thus a microeconomic equivalent of the Modigliani-Miller true growth
model in a world of antidiversification.l
A major concern in the field of Industrial Organization is an appropriate proxy for
monopoly power. Frequently, seller concentration, size, or profitability is taken to be the
measure of monopoly power. See Sullivan (1974), (1977), (1978), (1982) and Weiss
(1974) for an elaboration. The more theoretical market value-to-book value ratio is
another often examined measure of monopoly power (e.g. see Thomadakis 1977 and
Sullivan 1974, 1977, 1978) and may be derived by dividing equation (8) by the book

"lThe usual caveat of integrating a single-period model with a multi-period model applies.
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value of assets, KQj (i.e., by KZ ), after solving for Sj. The market-to-book ratio, MBj,
then is given by
MBJ =I + [k(l+R)]

{ f

z*2

j+ KR)(6-

+

1)}.

(11)

The relationship between shareholder diversification, dj, and the NPV optimizing output, Z *, is worthy of examination even though equation ( 10) is not tractable. A drawing
of the left-hand side (LHS) versus the right-hand side (RHS) of ( 10) for various values
of f is presented in Figure 1 and clearly illustrates the relationship. The solution set
where the LHS equals the RHS is given by the intersections, marked by circles, a smaller
f (i.e., a largerdj), which signifies more shareholderdiversification, increases the optimal
output.
The relationship between shareholderdiversification and a firm's market-to-book ratio
is somewhat clouded given that optimal output is itself a function of dj. Given Z*,
however, a straightforwardreading of equation ( 11 ) shows that a smaller f (i.e., a larger
dj) which signifies more shareholder diversification, decreases the market-to-book ratio.
An interestingquestion is what happens to a firm's market-to-bookratio under perfectly
competitive pricing (i.e., ?7goes to infinity). In the limit, equation ( 11) becomes (restoring
Q116for Z)
MBi = 1 + K( I + R) {fjQ}

(12)

In the context of the standard CAPM, it is a well-known result that competitive pricing
implies a market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q) of one. Within the Mayshar framework,
however, Tobin's Q is greater than one even under perfect competition. This result
obtains because the pricing mechanism allows for unsystematic as well as systematic risk.
Therefore, the extant literature that finds under perfect competition that Tobin's Q is
one implicitly must assume perfect shareholder diversification (a result not consistent
with the aforementioned surveys). It should be noted that the determination of all variables
is generally simultaneous.12 Thus, for example, the reader should be careful in trying to
go from equation 12 to the perfect diversification case because a substitution of dj equal
to one in equation (I) results in variance not being priced.

E(aj)- X cov* (aj,CFm)- 2 X J2.f Z*

t

/

10

/^-

+ KR)Z*6
6~~~~(Vj

Z*(OptmalOutput)

(f3 ' f2 ' f1l)
FIGURE 1. The Relationship Between Shareholder Diversification and Optimal Output.

12

We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
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TABLE 2
Regression Summary
Firms (N)

Industry
Aerospace
Aerospace

l

0

Pdj,MBj

8

0.403
0.43

|

~~~~~~1.202
(2.088)

|

a

0.014
(1.078)

Airlines

6

-0.826

(6563)

Appliances

4

-0.939

7.019
(5.322)

-0.823
(-3.860)*

Automotive

14

-0.325

(4.1756)

-0.009

Banks
Banks

46

-0.420

1.556

-0.009

Beverages
Beverages

8

Chemicals
Chemicals

|

Conglomerates

|

5

Drugs
Drugs

;

18

1.5138

-0.525

|

-0.986

0.08
0 0811

|

0.026
(1.271)
(-0.1033

(4.718)

0.002
(0.362)

2.400
(6.122)

-0.020
(-2.467)*

2.662

-0.026

~~~~~1.432

0.069

18

Containers
Containers

1.479

~~~~~~~
~~(1.712)

-0.047

29
29

(-2.932)

(-3.067)*
~~~~~~~~~(10.022)

0.461

10

Building Materials

|

(10.382)*
~~~~~~~~(21.895)

|

2.624

~~~~~~~
~~(2.434) ~

0.006
(0.324)

Electronics

27

-0.248

2.826

(-1.216)

Food Processing

33

-0.061

(2.472

-0.005

Food & Lodging

12

-0.291

(3.573)

(-0.964)

General Machinery

10

-0.489

1774.

(-12589)**

(1.078)

(01441)

7

0.541

15

-03
10
-0.310

~~~3.301
(3.322)

-0.026
(-1.174)

5

-0.406
-0.406

~~~~~~~1.605
( 1.929)

-0.012
(-0.769)

Misc. Manufacturing

40

-0.049

Natural Resources

28

Instruments

Leisure
Time
Leisure
Time

Metals
Metals

|

0.262(396(186*

1.886

1.037

(-0.003
0.008
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TABLE 2 (cont'd)
Industry

Firms (N)

Pad,Mfj

Nonbank Financial

34

-0.238

Office Equipment

16

-0.122

Oil Service

15

Paper
Paper

24

Personal
Care
Personal
Care

r

7

0.138

|

a0

a

2.855
(3.931)

-0.0 19
(-1.384)**

2.4

(2756)

(-0.461)

(0.5053)

--0.319
0.319 1(5.757)

~~~~~~~1.948

-0.012
( 1.579)**

-0.603
-0.603

~~~~4.076
(4.613)

(?1.689)**

4.357

-0.03 1

Publishing

18

-0.177

Railroads

6

0.116

0.992
(2.012)

Real Estate

4

-0.056

(1.181)

(-0.080)

31.402

(-0.024)

(-0.718)
0.002
(0.234)

Retailing (Food)

17

-0.423

(6.173)

Retailing (Non-Food)

46

-0.253

(5.321)

63
63

-0.181
-0.181

10

-0.290

(2.583)

-0.0858)

8

-0.586

2.360
(3.267)

-0.030
(-1.770)**

Textiles

16

-0.002

(2.558)

(-0.009)

Tires
Tires

6

-0.810
-0.810

Tobacco

4

0.259

Trucking
Trucking

7

-0.244
-0.244

Service

Service

Special Machinery

Steel

T

~~~~~~3.272
(5.006)

~~~~~~~2.104
(5.265)
1.462

~~~~~~2.558
(2.667)

(-01810)*

-0.023
-0.019

(- 1.439)**

-0.021
(-2.762)*
(0.379)
-0.009
(-0.563)

* Significant at 5% level (t-statistics in parentheses)
** Significant at 10%level (t-statistics in parentheses)

4. Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically examine the result that a firm's market-to-book ratio is
negatively related to shareholder diversification.
Our proxy for shareholderdiversification,c4,is the aforementioned percentageof shares
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held by institutional investors, a measure also used by Lakonishok and Shapiro ( 1986)
in the same context. To hold constant the micro-effects, we examined 37 industries using
1985 year-end data from Forbes January 13, 1986 for the following regression (regulated
industries were eliminated because market-to-book ratios are constrained close to one) 13
MBj = aeo+ al dj + Ej

where

(13)

MBj = the market price-to-book ratio,
dj = proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional investors,
ar0,a1 = intercept and slope estimates, respectively, and
Ei= error term.
The results are presented in Table 2. Of the 37 industries, 14 have statistically significant
negative coefficients (8 at 5% and 6 at 10%) with only one significant coefficient being
positive (at 10%). Thus, 14 of the 37 industries are consistent with the theoretical result
which predicts a negative relationship between price-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. The statistically nonsignificant results (of the remaining 22 industries 14
did have a negative sign) may, of course, result from many factors, such as, homogeneity
within industry groups and small sample sizes. Future research might look at time series
as well as other cross-sectional models.
5. Conclusion
The linkage between financial valuation and the product and factor markets faced by
the firm is an area rapidly developing in the literature. Our purpose is to examine a firm's
optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders hold a limited number of
risky assets. The primary theoretical result indicates that the market-to-book ratio is a
function of the degree of shareholder diversification. Our theory suggests a negative relationship between a firm's market-to-book ratio and shareholder diversification. We
suggest how management can ascertain the degree of its shareholders' diversification.
Finally, our empirical results, while not conclusive, should inspire future research.
13 We recognize that numerous studies have related market price-to-book value ratios to a wide variety of
independent variables. We have avoided adding variables that may not have strong theoretical justification.
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